Historically, Beijing always maintained a muted stance on nuclear vectors, even though
its first nuclear test was conducted way back in 1964. Mao himself was assertive about nuclear
weapons, calling it “paper tiger”, though immediately on the establishment of People’s Republic
of China (PRC), the country started its nuclear weapons and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) program. During a discussion with EF Hill an Australian communist leader and founder
of Communist Party of Australia in 1968, Mao stated “Our country, in a sense is still a non
nuclear power, with this little nuclear weaponry, we cannot be counted as a nuclear
country. If we are to fight a war, we must use conventional weapons”. Though China’s
official stance remains as ‘No First Use’, the present thought process among Chinese
strategists have evolved and internal debates are raging in China about the maintenance of
unconditional No First Use policy.
Today, Chinese strategists as per the renewed thinking, seek to maintain a portion of
Chinese strategic assets in Launch on Warning posture (LOW). Under a LOW posture, the
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) would launch nuclear weapons in retaliation
for an incoming strike that has been detected by intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems but not yet detonated on Chinese territory. It is important to
notice the 2023 US department of Defence’s Annual Report to Congress where a caution is
alarmed on China’s NFU. “The PRC’s current approach to nuclear force includes a declaratory
‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy, stating it will never use nuclear weapons first at any time under any
circumstances. This includes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against any non-nuclear weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Despite this policy,
China’s nuclear strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a non
nuclear attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates
the strategic effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would also consider nuclear use to
restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP regime
survival”.
The PLARF is an important pillar of PRC’s nuclear deterrence plan, which ensures
Chinese Autonomy and deters any third-party intervention in a regional conflict. PRC’s 2019
defence White Paper declares that the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and
reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counter attack, strengthening intermediate and
long-range precision strike force, and enhancing strategic counter balance capability, so as to build
a strong and modernised force”.
The PLARF has grown in strength even as PLA downsized as part of military reforms of
2015. China’s missile classification is based on the Dong Feng/DF and Hong Niao/HN series.
Dong Feng, meaning East Wind which are the Ballistic Missile Series, while the cruise missiles
are of Hong Niao (Red Bird) or Chang Jian/CJ (Long Sword) series. An informed estimate of
China’s ballistic missiles stands at 2200 including ninety ICBMs and it also holds approximately
320 nuclear warheads as of 2021, where the PLARF holds more than half of it, rest are
stockpiled or earmarked for submarine-based vectors. Even though the Chinese nuclear warhead
count seems relatively low, its arsenal is being upgraded continuously. China intends to hold 700
deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and 1,000 warheads by 2030, indicating that China is
moving beyond its Minimum Deterrent levels. It seems, PRC is progressing as planned, as per
latest inputs from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which estimates, 346 nuclear warheads for
land-based systems, the sea and air systems hold 72 and 20 respectively, 62 produced or under
production warheads, total amounting to 500. On the account of latest missile count, an
independent study estimates that China holds at least 1950 missiles, including 300 ICBMs,
hypersonic glide vehicles and anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Over the last seven decades PLARF has been grown in strength with primary focus on
Taiwan and South China Sea, with capabilities to contest India, Japan and the US. The long-term
state goal as declared by President Xi during the address to 19 th National Congress intends at
achieving its cherished Middle Kingdom stature in contemporary times. Under that umbrella
China intends to settle its boundary claims, however absurd it may be, in its own terms by all
possible means and the PLARF plays a major role in the gambit by providing strategic deterrence.
The PLARF posturing varies with the country against which it is manifesting. In the Taiwan
scenario, PLARF nuclear capable vectors act as deterrence to any western influence, primarily
the US. On the Russian front, the historical rivalry between the communist states of
past, doesn't exist anymore.
On India-China relationship, the boundary disputes and the growing stature of India in
geopolitical spectrum, have resulted in China perceiving India as a regional contestant. Under
this scope, a deliberate analysis of PLARF posturing, strategy and vector capabilities is a prudent
way-forward for Indian strategists. Such an analysis would assist in identifying the silos which
need immediate attention. The strategic forces of China may manifest in Indian context on a
Misinterpreted LOW or an opponent operational victory marker or de-stabilisation in Tibet/
Xinjiang. Any erroneous interpretation of ISR reports on LOW posture, may result in activation
of Chinese strategic forces which is a likely scenario and Indian planners need to plan for such
contingencies. As for the conventional conflict, an operational victory marker may be perceived
as a threat to the CCP regime which may result in manifestation of PLARF. Also, any
destabilization activity in TAR/XAR during an ensuing conventional conflict is a viable
trigger for employment of PLARF.
Even though the strategic equipment engagement strategy, is not oriented and aligned to
the base location and operational orientation, these factors do give out certain predictable
posturing and manifestation outcomes. Any Chinese Base that houses Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and ICBMs can cover the entire Indian subcontinent. However,
Base 64 located at Lanzhou, Gansu province and its units have a high probability of
manifesting in Indian context. Further analysis of the equipment profile of PLARF on the
basis range and quantum, indicates towards DF 26 held with the 64 series Brigades are
the most likely vectors that may have been earmarked by the PLARF for the Indian
contingency.
With this as a marker, the Indian strategic planners may envision capability building and
strategy review. Capability building needs focus under two silos, defence and diplomacy. The
defense silo needs early operationalisation of Ballistic Missile Early Warning and Anti
Ballistic Missiles systems. Also, to guard against precision strikes by cruise missiles and aerial
vectors investment into Missile Silo systems along with mobile systems seems mandatory.
Lastly, Full-fledged operationalisation of Nuclear Triad and strengthening its capabilities
continuously. The diplomatic silo must address and explore new fronts to strengthen the WMCC
(Working Mechanism on Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs) and use it
to de-escalate a conflict from growing, with a long term goal of resolving the border issue with
China amicably as per established systems and procedures. Any such resolution of long pending issue in
Indian context will make the path much easier to reach our goal of Viksit Bharat by 2047,
the centenary year of our independence.
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Srikumar Bharathi P is a serving officer in the
Indian Army and has authored a book on China, titled Know the
Dragon - Ready Reckoner on China. He has keen academic
interest in History, Strategy, Polity and Geo-Politics.
Disclaimer -The views expressed, suggestions made & quoting of prominent personalities in the article are solely the responsibility of the author and do not have any official endorsement.